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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to 
produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s important health 
policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength of findings and exposing 
gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decision-makers reliable information and new insights to 
inform complex policy decisions. For more information about the Synthesis Project, visit the Synthesis 
Project’s Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis products, please go 
to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail request to pubsrequest@rwjf.org.
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There is now considerable interest among private and public health care purchasers in using 
financial incentives to improve the quality of care delivered by physicians, as well as some 
disagreement over the likely consequences (47, 56). The concept has gained traction as a way for 
purchasers to better align physician payment and quality of care delivered. 
Pay-for-performance initiatives (P4P)1 are being pursued by state Medicaid programs 
and are of great interest to Medicare. Recently, Medicare linked its 2007 payment upgrades 
for physicians to the reporting of performance data, a step some regard as laying the foundation 
for a P4P program (41) as recommended by the Institute of Medicine (40). Meanwhile, a 2006 
survey reported that 28 states have adopted some type of pay-for-performance initiative in their 
Medicaid programs (43), and that half of these initiatives have been in existence for five years or 
more. It is not entirely clear how many programs are directed at physicians, but it would appear 
that most contain at least a physician component. 
Past experience—including with managed care—shows that financial incentives can 
be a powerful driver for physician behavior. 
To date, however, policy-makers have had little information on the effectiveness of 
P4P initiatives in shifting physician practice. They are interested in knowing to what extent 
and under what circumstances P4P will improve the quality of care delivered by physicians. This 
synthesis report reviews the available evidence on this issue, addressing five questions:
1. What explains the current widespread interest in physician P4P?
2. How are current incentive programs structured and how prevalent are they?
3. What performance measurement issues does physician P4P raise?
4. How do physicians perceive quality incentive programs? 
5. What is the research evidence on the impact of P4P?
These are important questions for federal and state policy-makers who have 
implemented, or are moving towards implementing, P4P initiatives in Medicare and 
Medicaid, as well as for large purchasers who seek to do the same. The findings will 
assist policy-makers and purchasers in clarifying expectations regarding P4P and implementing it 
effectively. 
What explains the current widespread interest in physician P4P?
Linking physician financial incentives to quality performance metrics is not new (52). 
During the early 1990s, HMO physician payment methodologies featured a complex blend of 
incentives mostly designed to constrain service use and encourage the delivery of care in lower-
cost settings and by less expensive providers, raising concerns about quality of care. Even then, 
however, many of these arrangements included quality-related incentives. For example, in a survey 
of HMOs conducted in 1992, about 20 percent of responding organizations said their payments to 
physicians incorporated some reimbursement for performance on quality of care, with 20 percent 
also reporting physician payments tied to consumer satisfaction measures (49). 
1 The idea has been discussed under the general rubrics of “Quality-Based Purchasing” (22) or “Value-Based Purchasing” (62, 64), 
but the term “pay-for-performance” (abbreviated to P4P) has become increasingly popular as a descriptive label. 
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During the early 1990s, a group of HMOs and large employers agreed on a set of performance 
measures—referred to as “HEDIS”2—to be reported annually on a voluntary basis by HMOs 
(8) (see Appendix II). It was expected that employers would consider the HEDIS scores of 
HMOs when making their health benefits contracting decisions. The development of the 
measures focused attention on issues relating to quality measurement, encouraged health plans 
to work with contracting physicians on initiatives to improve quality, created momentum 
for the adoption of electronic medical records systems in hospitals and physician offices and 
generated a set of measures that were widely accepted as legitimate quality indicators, at a 
population level. Nevertheless, HEDIS measures were largely limited to a small number of 
chronic diseases and the provision of a limited number of preventive services.
The HEDIS initiative led to other performance reporting initiatives. The 
dissemination of data on HEDIS measures spawned numerous efforts to refine quality 
measures and to develop measures that could be used to assess the performance of hospitals, 
physicians and physician groups. Employers came to believe that measures constructed at the 
provider level would be more useful to employees in making their health care decisions than 
measures of overall HMO performance. With most community providers available in most 
PPO networks, employees were increasingly choosing among providers, not plans (6, 7, 14, 31). 
During this time, research evidence was accumulating that the quality of 
ambulatory care left much to be desired. There was considerable opportunity for 
improvements in the quality of care delivered in physician offices (46) and a growing 
consensus that several different approaches to accomplishing quality improvement were 
needed (34, 35). In 2001, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on “Crossing the Quality 
Chasm” galvanized purchasers and physician organizations around the challenge of 
improving quality (39). A key recommendation of that report, and a subsequent IOM report 
(40), was that payment incentives for providers needed to be “realigned” to support quality 
improvement. 
Realigning payment incentives in the 1990s was part of a larger strategy to 
contain costs being developed by large employers and their benefit consultants in response 
to double-digit increases in employer health care costs that began in the late 1990s (31). Under 
this strategy, employees would share more health care costs at the point of service, creating 
financial incentives for them to play a more substantial role in health care decisions, including 
choice of provider. Employers and health plans would increase their efforts to measure 
provider performance and to disseminate information on the cost and quality of providers 
to employees and plan enrollees, resulting in a more “market-driven” system. The reward to 
higher quality physicians presumably would be that, over time, more patients would seek out 
their services, increasing practice revenues. Recognizing, however, that this “market reward” 
could take some time to develop, some purchasers also saw value in implementing more direct 
rewards for better quality care (71). 
2  Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set, see Appendix II.
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The present interest in reforming provider payment to reward quality of care is the 
result of a variety of forces:
•	 The	evolution	of	quality	measures	and	experience	gained	in	applying	those	measures	to	 
health plans
•	 Research	suggesting	significant	opportunities	for	quality	improvement
•	 Endorsement	of	P4P	from	high-profile	national	bodies,	including	the	Institute	of	Medicine
•	 The	support	of	some	large	purchasers,	who	see	it	as	a	potentially	valuable	complement	to	their	
“consumer-oriented” strategies
In addition to these forces, policy analysts have argued that overall payment approaches for 
physicians are deficient in many ways, including their impact on quality (see Figure 3 for 
descriptions of common payment approaches) (16, 54). 
Introduction
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How are current incentive programs structured and how prevalent  
are they? 
How prevalent are quality-related incentive programs for physicians?
Many, and perhaps the majority of, health plans now have P4P programs, but it is 
difficult to assess their growth and impact over time. Survey results tell us something 
about the presence of P4P programs (Figure 1), but it is not clear if their number or the share 
of physicians affected has increased substantially over time. Efforts to track the development of 
physician P4P programs are hampered by the lack of an annual survey conducted in a systematic 
way that generates publicly available results. 
Discussions of these programs typically highlight a relatively small number of ambitious efforts 
(e.g., Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA), Bridges to Excellence and the U.K. initiative; see 
Appendix III). Further, while many large health plans have P4P programs, these programs may 
apply to only a subset of contracting physician practices and individual physicians are not always 
aware of the P4P incentives in their contracts. 
Figure 1. Prevalence and features of P4P programs
Author Data used
Percent  
of plans with 
P4P initiatives 
 Percent of identified 
P4P initiatives rewarding 
physician performance 
Rosenthal (58) Author identified 37 P4P programs 76 
Rosenthal (61) Systematic survey of health plans in  
40 randomly selected health care markets
52 90 
Trude (70) Survey of health plans in 12 Community 
Tracking Study communities
77*  
* Under consideration, in planning stage or executed.
Just over one-quarter of primary care physicians report having quality-based 
compensation incentives. Using data from four physician surveys, Reschovsky and Hadley 
(53) found that in 2004/2005 just over one-quarter (28 percent) of primary care physicians in 
group practices reported quality-based incentives in their compensation arrangements, modestly 
higher than the share reporting such incentives in 1996/1997 (26 percent). The upward trend is partly 
due to physician movement to larger practice settings more likely to have quality-based incentives. 
The most common quality incentives facing U.S. primary care physicians are for 
meeting specific clinical targets and for patient satisfaction (Figure 2). Incentives for 
meeting clinical targets are encountered by 23 percent of U.S. primary care physicians, while those 
for patient satisfaction and quality of care processes are encountered by 20 and 19 percent of 
primary care physicians respectively.
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Figure 2. Percent of U.S. primary care physicians facing specific financial incentives for quality, 2006
Financial incentive for quality
Percent receiving or having  
potential to receive this incentive
Achieving certain clinical targets 23
High ratings for patient satisfaction 20
Participating in quality improvement activities 19
Enhanced preventive care activities 12
Managing patients with chronic disease/complex needs 8
Source: 2006 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey of Primary Care Physicians 
How are existing incentive programs structured?
A large number of authors have addressed the great number and variety of decisions that must 
be made in designing physician incentives to reward quality, with the most comprehensive 
description supplied by Dudley and Rosenthal (23) in their “Decision Guide to Purchasers”. 
The most important design decisions concern the type and size of incentives and the choice of 
measures to assess performance.
New incentive programs are layered on top of existing payment arrangements and, 
to some degree, seek to counter their incentives (Figure 3). It is possible that physician 
incentive programs, identical in other respects, could have different impacts on physician 
behavior depending on existing payment incentives. In fact, the situation for most physicians 
is likely to be quite complex. Within any single incentive program, there are typically multiple 
different performance measures, with each having a different potential for generating financial 
rewards. For a physician receiving payments from a variety of health plans and government 
programs, all with somewhat different basic payment approaches and different incentive schemes 
to reward quality, making rational decisions about how to allocate time and practice resources is 
likely to be daunting. 
As members of physician groups, many physicians are insulated from the direct 
effects of P4P incentives. These physicians are typically paid using some combination of a 
base salary and a “productivity incentive;” that is, a reward connected to the number of patients 
seen or the amount of practice revenue generated. Practices aggregate revenues from all payers, 
including payments from P4P programs, and distribute these revenues according to a formula 
approved by the physicians in the group. In this situation, the direct connection between the 
financial incentives of any single P4P program and the practice behavior of physicians would 
be mitigated by group decisions about contracts with payers, and by policies relating to the 
distribution of practice income.
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Figure 3. Physician payment approaches and the incentives they create
Approach Description Potential incentives created
Capitation The physician agrees 
to deliver a specified 
list of health services 
for a fixed amount per 
person. The physician 
bears financial risk. 
•	 The physician might act too aggressively in constraining 
service use, eliminating some “necessary” as well as some 
“unnecessary” services. The result could be lower quality of 
care for patients especially if there is no sharing of risks or 
surpluses, if the capitated contract is short-term in nature 
and if contract renewal does not depend on measures other 
than costs. 
•	 Conversely, if physician organizations reimbursed by 
capitation payments care for an enrolled population over a 
period of time, they have an incentive to provide services 
that maintain or improve the health of that population, as 
this will be financially beneficial in the long term. 
Fee-for-
service 
Physicians are paid 
for each unit of 
service provided.
•	 This form of payment contains a powerful incentive for 
“over-provision” of services and necessitates a substantial 
amount of costly monitoring on the part of the payer.
•	 There is a risk to patient health associated with “over-
treatment,” just as there is with “under-treatment” (39). 
•	 To modify the incentives under fee-for-service, 
arrangements based on payment per episode, payment 
per admission or evidence-based case rates have been 
introduced (19). These and similar approaches bundle 
services for payment purposes, creating incentives for 
physicians to limit the services they provide in response 
to a specific event. However, unlike capitation, physicians 
receive more revenues the greater number of events they 
treat. 
Salary The physician is paid 
a fixed amount per 
time period. 
•	 There is no incentive to deliver unnecessary services, 
nor is there an incentive for “under-provision,” except to 
the degree that physicians may “shirk” under salaried 
arrangements. 
•	 There is no particular incentive under a pure salary method 
of payment for physicians to deliver high quality care, so 
there typically is a heavy reliance on enforcement of rules 
and procedures thought to enhance quality. 
•	 The result could be quality enhancing or, to the degree that 
rule enforcement limits physician ability to bring professional 
judgment to bear in treatment decisions, result in lower 
quality of care.
Budgets Physicians may be 
reimbursed through 
a negotiated budget 
process at the orga-
nizational level. This 
method of payment is 
most often observed 
internationally in gov-
ernment administered 
health care systems. 
•	 The nature of the incentives in this payment arrangement 
can resemble capitation, when the number of individuals 
served in a given period is relatively fixed, and the 
organization is at risk for budget over-runs and can keep 
savings. 
•	 Or, the incentives can resemble those of salaried physicians 
when the organization serves patients who seek care, but 
does not assume responsibility to provide care to a fixed 
number, or enrolled group, of individuals for a specified time 
period.
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Again, different physician groups are likely to respond to the same quality-related incentive 
scheme in different ways, depending on their cost structures, infrastructure supporting care 
delivery and general culture (69). But, in any case, the link between the quality incentive 
provided by a payer and the response of an individual physician in treating a specific patient is 
likely to be indirect at best.
A key decision point in developing P4P programs is whether incentives should 
reward improvement or meeting benchmarks (Figure 4). The different payment methods 
actually used by P4P programs have been described in a number of publications (23, 24, 52, 57, 
58, 61, 63, 72, 73). The argument in favor of rewarding improvement is that there are potentially 
greater gains to be made in the quality of care received by patients of low-performing physicians. 
If rewards are made only for achieving benchmarks, and these benchmarks are set at a high level, 
low-performing physicians may be discouraged from making the effort to improve their quality. 
The arguments in favor of rewarding achievement of target levels of performance are essentially 
the reverse. That is, physicians who deliver superior care deserve to be rewarded for their efforts. 
Rewarding low-performing physicians could create adverse incentives for high-performing 
groups and raise questions about the credibility of the payer’s efforts. 
The problem of whether to pay for improvement or for achieving care benchmarks was under-
scored by the experience of Pacificare’s incentive program, which used quality benchmarks to al-
locate reward dollars (see Appendix III). Rosenthal et al. (60) reported that physician groups that 
had high scores on quality indicators at the program’s inception and showed little subsequent 
improvement received the bulk of the reward dollars distributed through this program. 
A second important design decision is whether performance targets should 
be fixed or relative. The use of fixed quality benchmarks, as in the PacifiCare program 
(Appendix III), means that all physicians who meet the benchmarks are rewarded. From a 
physician’s point of view, this “certainty” is desirable, as the practice can weigh the costs of 
making the changes necessary to achieve the benchmark against a certain reward. This could 
encourage physician practices to invest in quality improvement activities, depending on the size 
of the reward (73). However, from a payer’s point of view, the total amount that will be spent 
under the P4P program becomes uncertain, unless it is capped as part of the program design. If 
the benchmarks are set relatively low, in an attempt to encourage physician efforts, the cost of 
the program could exceed payer expectations. This apparently was the case in the first year of 
the U.K.’s physician pay-for-performance program (20, 30; Appendix III). Benchmarks were set 
at a 75 percent adherence level, but average performance was at the 93 percent level, resulting in 
much larger than expected government payments and a general consensus that targets were set 
“too low” (30). 
An alternative for payers is to reward physician practices for being in the top “tier” of physicians 
eligible to receive awards (e.g., the top ten percent of practices). In effect, physician practices 
compete against each other for a fixed amount of reward money, making the program easier for 
payers to budget (23). For physicians, however, the relationship between their performance and 
the probability of receiving a reward depends not only on their efforts, but also on the efforts 
of other physician practices. A physician practice could show great improvement, and even 
exceed national performance benchmarks, but not be rewarded if other practices do better still. 
Uncertainty regarding receipt of the reward could discourage physician practices from investing 
in the infrastructure changes necessary to improve the quality of their care. 
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Figure 4. Decision points in designing P4P incentives
What type of targets?
Fixed
•	Provides certainty  
for physicians
•	 Payers	are	uncertain	
of costs
Relative
•	 Less	physician	 
control
•	 Payers	may	have	 
more certainty
What is 
rewarded?
Improvement
•	 Low	achievers	have	stronger	
incentives to improve quality,  
but high achievers are 
“punished”
•	 Rewards	may	go	to	physicians	
whose performance does not 
meet quality standards
Example:  
Rewards physicians 
with X percent 
improvement on 
mammogram rate
Example:  
Rewards physicians 
with mammogram rate 
improvement in top X 
percent
 
Achieving Benchmarks
•	 Rewards	superior	physicians,	 
but without motivating 
improvement
•	 Incentives	may	be	out	of	reach	
for low performers
Example:  
Rewards physicians 
with X mammogram 
rate
Example:  
Rewards physicians with 
mammogram rate in top X 
percent
The frequency with which HMOs choose each of these approaches is reported by Rosenthal et 
al. (61). (There are no systematic data regarding their use by other payers, such as PPOs.) Of 113 
HMOs responding to a survey and reporting a physician incentive program, 20 percent said 
they paid for improvements in physician performance and 62 percent paid for achievement of a 
fixed performance threshold. Forty percent of HMOs said the average payment was less than five 
percent of their total payment to physicians, while 28 percent said that the maximum bonus a 
physician could receive was less than five percent. 
What performance measurement issues does physician P4P raise?
Payers typically employ a mix of performance measures in their physician incentive programs, 
including measures of clinical care, patient satisfaction, use of information technology, patient 
satisfaction scores and indicators of practice efficiency. The clinical measures are used as direct 
indicators of quality of care. Typically, they relate to diabetes care, blood pressure control,  
asthma, anti-depressant medications, cholesterol management, screening tests and immunizations 
for children. 
Clinical performance measures in most P4P programs draw heavily from HEDIS  
(57; Appendix II). This takes advantage of the fact that health plans and physicians have 
experience collecting and reporting data on these measures, costs for these activities are relatively 
low (many of the measures are constructed using existing claims files maintained by the plans) 
and the measures are familiar to employers. However, as discussed below, payers face several 
measurement challenges when they attempt to construct HEDIS and related performance 
indicators at the physician or physician practice, as opposed to the health plan, level (31). In 
addition, HEDIS measures address mostly processes of care and not health care outcomes, and 
only target recommended care for certain conditions.
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How is risk adjustment carried out? 
Physicians who attract more than their share of clinically complicated patients 
may find it difficult to score well on quality indicators that are based on patient 
outcomes. Or, the recommended clinical processes embodied in the performance indicators 
may not be appropriate for patients with multiple, complicated conditions. When this is the case, 
it seems fair to “adjust” physician scores to reflect differences in “patient mix”, but risk-adjustment 
methods may not be applicable to a pay-for-performance program, or they may not be acceptable 
to physicians (47). 
A straightforward way to address this problem is to allow physicians to exclude 
patients from performance measurement who have certain pre-specified 
characteristics. This form of “risk adjustment”, adopted in the U.K.’s pay-for-performance 
program (Appendix III), seemed to foster a certain amount of “gaming”. Physicians who excluded 
larger percentages of their patients from performance measurement achieved higher performance 
scores (20). Also, when performance is measured at the individual physician level, risk adjustment 
by exclusion creates the possibility that too few patients of particular types will be left in the 
practice to reliably measure physician performance.
What is an adequate sample for measuring performance? 
Substantial variation in physician performance metrics from year-to-year based 
on random effects can challenge the credibility of pay-for-performance programs. 
This can happen when the number of patients in a physician’s practice with a particular clinical 
problem (e.g., diabetes) is relatively small or when the number of patients associated with the 
payer implementing the pay-for-performance program is small. As the number of patients used to 
calculate performance increases, the impact of random effects on the measures is more likely to be 
“averaged out,” and changes over time and across physicians are more likely to accurately reflect 
differences in performance. Nonetheless, some research suggests that, for certain types of patients, it 
may be difficult to construct reliable measures of performance at the individual physician level (38). 
Several steps have been taken to address this problem, including restricting performance measures 
to care provided for patients with very common conditions, measuring performance at the 
physician group, rather than the individual physician, level3 and aggregating data across payers 
when constructing performance measures.4 
What is the justification for using claims data? 
The use of claims data to construct physician performance measures is attractive 
because the data are readily available and their use minimizes data collection and 
reporting costs for physicians. But several issues are associated with this approach: there are 
a limited number of measures that can be constructed from these data; physicians raise questions 
about the accuracy of claims data for measuring their performance; and there is uncertainty 
about how sensitive claims-based measures are to changes in performance. The increased use of 
electronic medical records by physicians could alleviate some of these concerns, but creates its 
own set of complications relating to compatibility across physician offices and payers.
3  Only 13 percent of responding HMOs in Rosenthal et al. (61) focused incentives on individual physicians.
4 The IHA initiative aggregates data across multiple payers, focusing on performance at the medical group level (Appendix III).
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How can measurement address the issue of multiple providers? 
Not all patients have an easily identifiable “medical home”. The treatment of patients 
with chronic conditions typically involves multiple practitioners, including several physicians 
(55). This raises the issue of how to connect patients to physicians for the purpose of performance 
measurement, especially in PPO benefit structures. Claims-based algorithms have been developed 
for this purpose, but physicians who are “assigned” patients under these algorithms do not 
necessarily see this process as fair because both the receipt and the amount of the reward can be 
affected by the actions of physicians who they may not know and who are not connected with 
their practices. 
How many measures should be tracked? 
The use of a limited number of performance measures in pay-for-performance 
programs has advantages. It can focus attention on areas with the greatest potential for 
quality improvement and, by concentrating incentive payments on these areas, capture the 
attention of physicians. However, directing attention to a few areas of care could divert resources 
away from treating patients with other conditions. As a result, quality could improve in the areas 
being rewarded, but decline for other diseases and conditions.
What is the impact of patient compliance? 
Measures of patient outcomes are affected by the decisions of patients as well as 
the actions of physicians. This raises an issue of fairness, as different physicians treat patients 
with different levels of knowledge and financial resources. There is concern that physicians who 
treat lower income, less educated patients may perform relatively poorly on some measures 
because their patients are less able to effectively manage their conditions or face financial barriers 
in accessing care. For example, lower income women may be less likely to seek mammograms 
because of the cost of transportation to the physician’s office or due to a lack of health insurance, 
and patients with low levels of “health literacy” may not fully understand the instructions for 
chronic care medication. Practices serving predominately less educated, lower income patients may 
struggle to generate adequate revenues under existing payment systems, and pay-for-performance 
programs may provide them with little opportunity to increase their revenues. In fact, concern 
was expressed prior to implementation of the U.K.’s pay-for-performance program that physician 
practices located in low-income areas might, over time, relocate to more affluent areas in order to 
improve their scores on performance indicators (55).
How do physicians perceive quality incentive programs? 
Research suggests that efforts to improve clinical care processes seldom succeed 
without physician support and engagement. Several authors have made the same point 
with respect to pay-for-performance (12, 67) and physician engagement is deemed essential in the 
AMA’s Guidelines for Pay-for-Performance Programs. The receptivity of physicians to financial 
incentive programs that reward quality could well be a critical factor in determining their success. 
There have been several published and unpublished studies that have explored the views of 
physicians and practice administrators about the use of financial incentives to reward quality. 
These studies collect data through in-depth interviews of small numbers of physicians (9, 67) 
and practice administrators (4, 10) and through physician surveys (12, 74). Their results generally 
suggest that: 
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•	 Physicians	support	the	concept	of	financial	incentives	that	reward	quality	(10,	12,	67).
•	 Physicians	have	little	confidence	in	the	ability	of	payers,	and	specifically	health	plans,	to	 
design and carry out reward systems that are fair and effective (10, 12, 67, 74).
•	 Physicians	who	are	delivering	care	under	a	P4P	program	may	not	know	about	the	program	or	
how it works (9).
•	 Physicians	are	concerned	about	the	possible	proliferation	of	P4P	programs	associated	with	
different payers, and the costs this could impose on their practices.
•	 Physicians	perceive	that	there	is	a	risk	of	unintended	consequences	resulting	from	physician	
P4P (12).
What is the research evidence on the impact of P4P?
Assessing the impact of financial incentives that reward physician performance on quality 
measures is complex. In this section, we review the research findings on three questions:
•	 Does	P4P	result	in	better	quality	care?	
•	 Does	P4P	result	in	other,	intended	or	unintended,	changes	in	physician	practices?
•	 Do	the	financial	benefits	of	P4P	outweigh	the	costs?
Does P4P result in better quality care? 
With Medicare and Medicaid at various stages of designing and implementing 
programs, understanding whether P4P results in better quality is a critical policy 
question. There are two types of research studies with findings relevant to this question: 
controlled experiments and program evaluations. (For brief summaries of specific experiments and 
programs, see Appendices V and VI.)
Controlled Experiments in the United States
These studies typically involve relatively small numbers of physician practices and 
patients. The practices are randomly assigned to a group exposed to incentive payments and 
a group that is not. Data are collected on a very limited number of quality measures, typically 
screening procedures or immunizations, before and after the incentive payments are put in 
place. The expectation is that, at the end of the study period, the physicians practicing under the 
incentive plan will show greater improvement with respect to the chosen quality measures than the 
other practices. 
The strongest controlled studies provide little evidence that financial incentives 
improved quality of care. The results may have been due to the structure of the 
programs, the small payments or the difficulty untangling the impact of incentives 
from other quality improvement approaches.
Eight different review articles have been published that address, at least in part, controlled 
experiments and their findings. Six of these reviews took a broad approach in searching the 
literature (4, 16, 22, 51, 59), while one limited its attention to preventive care (68) and another to 
immunizations (1). In practice, the search strategy employed made little difference, as virtually all 
of the incentive schemes involved paying for preventive care of some type. 
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All of the reviews incorporated a core group of studies: Grady et al. (32); Kouides et al. (42); 
Hillman et al. (36, 37), and Fairbrother et al. (25, 26). In general, the review articles concluded 
that these controlled studies provided very little evidence that financial incentives improved 
the quality of care provided by physicians. The authors offered several explanations for why the 
controlled experiments were not more effective in improving quality of care, including:
•	 Substantial	quality	improvements	sometimes	were	observed	in	the	comparison	group	
of physicians, making it difficult for the “incentive group” to demonstrate even greater 
improvement.
•	 The	payments	were	relatively	small	in	some	cases	and/or	constituted	a	small	portion	of	total	
practice revenues; as a result, the incentives may have been too weak to motivate physicians to 
respond, especially given that the experiments were time-limited.
•	 In	some	studies,	it	was	difficult	to	separate	the	effects	of	the	financial	incentives	from	other	
concurrent efforts by practices to improve quality.
•	 There	were	weaknesses	in	implementation,	especially	in	communication	with	physicians	
participating in the study.
•	 Improvement	on	preventive	care	measures	depends	on	the	actions	of	patients	as	well	as	
physicians. In studies where physician practices served economically disadvantaged patients, 
financial and other patient-related barriers to care may have limited the ability of physicians to 
increase use of preventive services on the part of their patients.
 
In a study where significant improvements on performance measures were 
reported, the authors found that these improvements primarily reflected the better 
documentation of care (25). They conducted a subsequent study to determine if, over 
time, actual quality of care improvements would occur, but again concluded that much of the 
improvement observed in the extended study was due to better documentation. Hillman et al. 
(36, 37) concluded that there was no evidence that financial incentives improved care in either of 
their studies. Through further analysis, they found that only about half of the physician practices 
in the intervention group knew about the financial incentives, despite efforts to communicate 
with them about the program. 
Policy-makers involved in “real world” initiatives are likely to have limited interest 
in the results of controlled experiments. One reason is that controlled experiments are 
mostly designed to be time-limited research projects. Under these circumstances, physicians may 
not find it financially or professionally attractive to invest in the practice changes necessary to 
improve their scores on performance measures. Larger scale and fully implemented P4P programs 
are likely to be perceived as permanent by physicians and, possibly, as harbingers of future 
changes in reimbursement policies across all payers. The effect of the same set of incentives 
could be quite different in these two types of programs. A second issue relating to controlled 
experiments is their small scale. Even if study findings supported the use of financial incentives 
to improve quality, it might not be possible to “scale up” the study design in a real world setting. 
Finally, controlled experiments typically use a very limited number of performance measures, and 
these measures may, or may not, be the quality measures of interest to public sector incentive 
programs for physicians. (For a general discussion of the strengths and limitations of different 
research approaches used in assessing the impact of financial incentives intended to improve the 
quality of physician care, see Appendix IV.)
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Program Evaluations in the United States
Because they assess the “real world” application of interventions, program eval-
uations produce results that are the most relevant to policy-makers. These evaluations 
address incentive programs that have been implemented by large purchasers, primarily health plans 
(2, 5, 15, 27, 33, 44, 45, 48, 60). There are no review articles that synthesize their findings. 
Program evaluations of P4P initiatives show more positive results than findings 
from controlled experiments (Appendices V and VI). Every program evaluation 
found improvement in one or more quality indicator. The evaluations also provide useful 
insights into measurement and implementation issues. As one would expect, however, given the 
“real world” settings in which the financial incentives were implemented, the impact of incentives 
themselves on quality improvement cannot be determined with complete confidence.
•	 Most	P4P	programs	combine	financial	incentives	with	other	efforts	to	improve	care,	suggesting	
that program implementers typically view P4P as one part of a multi-faceted organizational 
strategy supporting quality improvement. From an evaluation perspective, this makes it 
extremely difficult to assess the incremental contribution of P4P to any observed quality 
improvements.
•	 Most	studies	have	not	used	contemporaneous	control	groups,	raising	the	possibility	that	
observed improvements might have occurred without the program.
•	 Most	program	evaluations	have	focused	on	a	subset	of	program	quality	indicators,	so	it	is	not	
possible to assess how P4P has affected quality of care broadly defined.
•	 Physician	participation	in	P4P	programs	typically	has	been	voluntary,	raising	the	question	
of whether the subset of physicians observed in evaluations consists primarily of those who 
expected to score well under program specifications. If this is the case, generalizing evaluation 
findings to all physicians may not be warranted.
•	 Most	evaluations	have	focused	exclusively,	or	to	a	significant	degree,	on	diabetes	care.	Their	
results may not generalize to other types of care.
Evaluations of additional P4P programs (including the IHA effort (18)) soon will be forthcoming, 
and they promise to add substantially to the present knowledge base. However, some of the 
challenges that confronted the early evaluations will continue. Consequently, it may not be 
possible to obtain a definitive estimate of the impact of financial incentives alone on physician 
performance. 
Does P4P result in other, intended or unintended, changes in physician practices?
To date, there is little evidence on the secondary effects of P4P initiatives. This is 
not surprising given the small number of published P4P program evaluations and the fact that 
these effects might only develop over time. Despite the lack of hard evidence, the literature on 
P4P speculates on a number of possible changes that could result from implementing financial 
incentives rewarding quality of physician care, many of which are viewed as negative. For instance, 
Roland (55) identified possible undesirable “secondary effects” that concerned implementers 
of the National Health Service (NHS) P4P program. These included: physicians may move 
their practices to areas where they believe patients can more effectively manage their own care; 
coordination of care could decline, especially for patients with multiple illnesses; physicians might 
focus on improving care only in areas addressed by financial rewards; and practice administrative 
costs could increase. Casalino and Elster (13) also expressed concern that P4P programs for 
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physicians in the United States could affect the care received by minorities in an adverse manner, 
exacerbating existing racial and ethnic disparities in care. Rosenthal (56) has suggested that, 
while secondary effects such as these cannot be eliminated, they can be managed through careful 
program design.
Physician “gaming” is a likely secondary effect of P4P. One of the more dramatic 
secondary effects of P4P was reported in an analysis of first year performance under the U.K.’s P4P 
program (20). Exclusion of patients from performance calculations was permitted as a form of risk 
adjustment, as long as exclusion criteria were followed. Doran et al. (20) found that physicians 
who excluded higher proportions of patients received more P4P reward monies. And, because a 
relatively large amount of “exception reporting” was concentrated in a small number of practices, 
there is at least the suggestion that some physicians were “gaming” the exclusion process. 
Doran et al. (20) also reported that physician performance was lower “…in practices with a high 
proportion of patients who were living in single-parent or low-income households” providing 
some credence to concerns that practices serving low-income or disadvantaged populations 
might struggle under P4P programs. In contrast, in an analysis of data from Scotland, Sutton and 
McLean (66) found that practices located in “deprived” areas had higher quality scores. Their 
analysis also suggested that larger practices, with more clinicians, performed better on clinical 
quality indicators, while practices that received more money from sources other than the NHS 
performed less well. They concluded that the incentive effect of the P4P program was weaker for 
these latter practices. 
Possible secondary effects that could be viewed as positive include: greater investment in 
electronic medical records systems by physician practices; an expanded role for nurses in the 
management of patients; greater numbers of physicians specializing in primary care (assuming 
P4P increases primary care physician incomes); and better documentation of care delivered in 
physician practices. 
Emerging research suggests that better documentation is a secondary effect of 
P4P initiatives. There is evidence that one early effect of P4P in the U.S. and the U.K. may 
be better physician documentation of the care they provide in areas targeted by P4P (1, 25, 26, 
30, 65). This is understandable, as better documentation may be the least costly action that 
physicians can take to improve their scores on quality indicators. Improving documentation of 
care is desirable for a variety of reasons, but P4P sponsors may be disappointed if it is the only 
outcome, and their award monies did not buy any actual increase in quality. Paying for improved 
documentation, however, may be a relatively short-lived phenomenon if physicians quickly 
exhaust opportunities to increase payments through this strategy. 
Roland also reported that practices in the U.K. increased the number of nurses and other staff 
they employed, concurrently with the implementation of P4P (30). Physicians can add clinical 
and other expertise to their practices relatively quickly if there is the potential for that action to 
increase practice income. There also has been an upward trend in physician practice investment in 
electronic medical records in the U.K, but this probably was underway prior to P4P, stimulated by 
government reporting requirements (30).
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Do the financial benefits of P4P outweigh the costs?
Only one study to date addresses this issue, and it shows a positive rate of return 
for an HMO incentive program. 
Recent P4P program evaluations have focused primarily on quality impacts. However, given the 
various alternatives available to policy-makers to improve quality, it is reasonable to ask if P4P 
programs deliver benefits that exceed their direct costs. The costs of P4P programs include, at a 
minimum, the value of payouts to physicians and the costs of program administration. (A more 
challenging standard would require P4P programs to deliver net benefits that exceeded the net 
benefits of alternative approaches to quality improvement.)
Curtin et al. (17) attempted to address this question using evidence from an incentive program 
implemented within an HMO. The HMO rewarded adherence to treatment protocols in three 
clinical areas, as well as efficiency and patient satisfaction. The rewards program was carried out 
in the context of other attempts by the HMO to improve quality in these areas. The evaluators 
focused only on diabetes care, comparing projected treatment costs (trending forward past costs) 
to actual costs to estimate the benefits from the program. 
The authors found a positive rate of return for the initiative, even though the 
program required providing additional services to diabetics. The authors acknowledged 
that their study design was limited by the lack of a contemporaneous control group, the short 
time period over which trends were calculated and results measured and the presence of other 
quality improvement efforts. The demand on the part of payers for evidence concerning the net 
financial benefits of P4P seems likely to increase if more P4P evaluations are able to document 
quality improvements. At the present time, however, this single study clearly cannot provide a 
definitive assessment of the rate of return from P4P programs. One would expect the rate of return 
to vary with type of condition and characteristics of the program setting, as well as the amount of 
monies paid to physicians.
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Program evaluations indicate that P4P, when combined with other quality initiatives, is associated 
with quality improvement; however, the role of P4P in contributing to those improvements often 
is unclear. Nevertheless, the evaluations do provide some specific guidance for Medicare and 
Medicaid policy-makers as they design and implement P4P programs. 
Budgeting for P4P
A critical design issue is whether to use predetermined quality benchmarks as a basis for paying 
physicians in a P4P program. While relatively simple to implement and to explain to participating 
physicians, paying specified amounts to all physicians or physician organizations that achieve 
quality benchmarks can result in a relatively unpredictable funding commitment and could lead to 
expenditures in excess of budgeted amounts. This is especially the case if accurate, timely data on 
physician performance are not available at the time the benchmarks and rewards are established. 
Defining expectations regarding initial performance
Policy-makers should be aware that initial payments to physicians in a P4P program could yield 
relatively little actual improvement in quality, depending on the structure of the reward system 
adopted. The evaluations suggest that this can occur for two reasons. Where payments are made 
based on benchmarks, dollars could flow primarily to physicians who performed at the benchmark 
level of quality prior to program implementation. In effect, these payments represent a reward 
for past performance, and will not necessarily result in substantial quality improvement. To raise 
the overall level of quality in the initial years of public P4P programs, policy-makers may wish 
to consider rewarding improvement on quality measures, even though this raises the difficult 
question of whether it is appropriate to reward physicians whose performance on quality measures 
may still (after improvement) be low. Second, irrespective of whether measures of improvement or 
achievement are used in calculating rewards, observed improvement may reflect better physician 
documentation of care and not actual improvement in quality, at least in initial program years.
Allocating resources for program management 
While there is likely to be pressure in public programs to spend a relatively large proportion of 
P4P funds on direct payments to physicians, there is evidence from existing programs that, with 
respect to raising the level of quality, “the devil is in the details.” Specifically, adequate funds will 
need to be allocated initially for communication with physicians regarding how performance 
is measured and rewards are structured. Also, if insufficient funds are allocated to program 
administration, resulting in payment delays or inaccurate payments, the credibility of the program 
could suffer, potentially affecting physicians’ willingness to invest in achieving quality goals.
Committing to ongoing surveillance
Some type of “gaming” of the P4P rules seems not only possible, but likely, under any set of rules 
governing P4P programs. Policy-makers will need to allocate administrative funds and effort to 
oversight and be prepared to take corrective actions where necessary to protect program legitimacy. 
Impl cations for Policy-Makers
Paying for quality: Understanding and assessing physician pay-for-performance initiatives | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 13 | 17 
Implications for Policy-Makers
Establishing P4P Demonstrations 
Because of the limited research evidence regarding P4P effectiveness under different program 
designs and reward structures, Medicare administrators should consider establishing and 
evaluating demonstration programs designed to systematically vary elements of program design 
that seem most likely to influence the nature and size of the impacts of P4P on physician 
behavior (21, 28). These arguably would include size of rewards, type and number of measures 
used, characteristics of the quality improvement strategies within which P4P is implemented and 
proportion of physician revenues affected. With respect to the latter, Medicare and Medicaid 
might consider partnering with private health plans in mounting demonstration programs. All 
demonstration programs, whatever their specific design features, should take place over a time 
period sufficiently long for physicians to invest in infrastructure changes needed to improve 
quality and for P4P program administrators to observe possible unintended impacts.
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The literature on the response of physicians to financial rewards for providing better quality care is 
understandably sparse, although there is substantial interest in this topic among policy-makers. As 
a result, future research findings will be immediately useful in policy development. We believe that 
a research agenda should begin by addressing the following areas, with the understanding that new 
questions are likely to arise as the evidence base expands:
•	 Systematic	documentation	of	the	prevalence	and	characteristics	of	P4P-type	programs	for	
physicians, as well as their evolution over time.
•	 Expansion	in	the	number	and	types	of	performance	measures	addressed	by	evaluations,	in	
order to provide a more complete perspective on P4P effectiveness. Past evaluations have often 
been limited to a subset of measures used in P4P programs.
•	 Analysis	of	the	factors	that	explain	variation	in	physician	responses	(e.g.,	size	and	type	
of reward, practice characteristics, patient population characteristics) using different 
methodological approaches in order to enhance understanding of how, and under what 
circumstances, P4P is likely to be most effective.
•	 Analysis	of	the	differential	impact	of	financial	incentives	when	they	are	combined	with	other	
quality improvement efforts.
•	 Tracking	of	physician	responses	to	P4P	programs	over	time,	as	performance	measures	and	
rewards change, to determine if short-term and long-term effects differ.
•	 Estimation	of	the	net	benefits	of	P4P	efforts	versus	other	possible	approaches	to	improving	
quality, under different circumstances and for different patient conditions.
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Effectiveness  
of care
Access and 
availability
Patient  
utilization
Satisfaction  
with the care 
experience
Plan stability  
and  
management Cost of care
•	Cancer 
screening
•	Cholesterol 
management 
for patients with 
cardio-vascular 
conditions
•	Adult access to 
preventative/ 
ambulatory 
health services
•	Children and 
adolescents’ 
access to 
primary care 
practitioners
•	Call answer 
timeliness and 
abandonment
•	Impatient 
utilization—
acute and 
nonacute care
•	Ambulatory care
•	Mental health 
utilization
•	CAHPS 4.0H 
adult survey
•	CAHPS 3.0H 
child survey
•	Children 
with chronic 
conditions
•	Board 
certification of 
physicians
•	State enrollment 
per product line
•	Diversity of 
membership
•	Relative 
resource use 
for people with 
diabetes
•	Relative 
resource use 
for people with 
acute back pain
•	Relative 
resource use 
for people with 
COPD
HEDIS is a collection of standardized performance measures that the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance (NCQA) updates annually. Development of HEDIS 1.0 by a group of HMOs 
and several large national employers began in 1989 and took two years to complete. By 1992, 
however, NCQA assumed responsibility for HEDIS.1,2 The standardized HEDIS measures allow 
comparisons across health plans in categories such as effectiveness of care, access and availability, 
health plan stability and management, cost, patient utilization, and satisfaction with the care 
experience. Approximately 560 health plans are expected to submit data for construction of 
HEDIS measures in 2007. While some report voluntarily, others, such as BlueCross BlueShield of 
Montana, are required by state law to report HEDIS measures.3 HEDIS originated with HMOs, 
but efforts are underway to encourage commercial PPOs to voluntarily submit their HEDIS and 
CAHPS data to NCQA. In 2006, over 80 PPOs submitted data, more than twice the number of 
PPOs that submitted in 2005.
1  Schoenbaum S. “What’s Ahead on Quality: The Managed Care Perspective.” Physician Executive, Nov-Dec, 1993.
2  National Chronic Care Consortium. State of the Art in Network Performance Measures. Available at: http://www.nccconline.org/
products/N32097.pdf.
3  BlueCross BlueShield of Montana. Available at: http://www.bcbsmt.com/Providers/providers_pub-hedis.asp0.
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PacifiCare
PacifiCare Health Systems, a subsidiary of United Healthcare, has over three million plan 
members and nearly nine million specialty plan members.1 PacifiCare contracts with about 300 
large multispecialty physician organizations and has measured the performance of these groups 
on clinical and patient satisfaction indicators since 1993.2 In 2002, the health plan implemented 
a new quality incentive program (QIP) for its California network, and in 2003 it began paying its 
physician organizations in California bonuses for meeting or exceeding ten clinical and patient 
satisfaction measures.2 PacifiCare is a member of the Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA) and 
a participant in the IHA statewide pay-for-performance program.
1 PacifiCare company profile: http://www.pacificare.com/commonPortal/link?navnode=CompanyProfiles.6.
2 Rosenthal MB., Frank RG, Li Z, Epstein AM. “Early Experience with Pay-for-Performance: From Concept to Practice.” Journal of 
the American Medical Association, vol. 294, no. 14, 2005.
Clinical Patient experience Information technology
• Diabetes management →	Percent of 
members 18–75 with diabetes who had 
each of the following
— HbA1c
— HbA1c poor control >9.0%
— LDL-C screening <100 mg/dl
— Nephropathy monitoring
• Breast Cancer Screening →	Percent of 
women 40–69 with annual mammogram
• Percent of adults 50–80 who had 
appropriate screening for colorectal 
cancer
• Doctor-patient communication
— Can patient easily understand clinical 
guidance?
— Did physician show respect for 
patient?
• Timely access to care
— Can patients get an appointment 
when they want one?
— Do the appointments start on time?
• Specialty Care
— Can patients get an appointment to 
see a specialist if needed?
• Integrate clinical electronic datasets for 
population management
— Computerized registries updated 
twice per year
— Actionable reports/query lists from 
a disease registry updated twice per 
year
• Support clinical decision making at point 
of care:
— E-prescribing
— E-drug checks for safety and 
efficiency
— E-lab results
— E-Reminders
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BlueCross BlueShield of Michigan
BlueCross BlueShield of Michigan (BCBSM) began operating the Physician Group Incentive 
Program (PGIP) in January 2005. The program targeted three components of the delivery process 
for improvement: chronic illness treatment, prescribing patterns for BCBSM members, and 
physician participation in care management and shared decision-making programs.1
In quarter two of 2006, BCBSM launched its Physician Organization Gain Sharing program 
(POGS) to “strengthen the performance improvement infrastructure available to clinicians” and to 
achieve measurable savings in the following care delivery areas: pharmacy, laboratory, diagnostic 
imaging, in-network referrals and hospitalizations.2,3 In the POGS, physician organizations receive 
defined payments based on the size of their BCBSM membership, and BCBSM commits to 
sharing at least 50 percent of overall program savings with selected physicians.3
As of January 2007, the PGIP and POGS Incentive Programs (combined) include 31 physician 
groups comprised of 5,500 physicians treating 1,277,000 patients. BCBSM paid out $19.9 million 
in incentives in CY2006 and reported a generic dispensing rate increase of 1.5 percent from CY 
2005 to 3rd quarter 2006 and forecast a four percent increase for 2007.3
1 Collaborating for Quality Improvement: BCBSM Value Report. October 2005. Available at: http://www.bcbsm.com/pdf/ 
collaborating_quality_improvement.pdf.
2 Phone call with Mark Casmer, Manager for Clinical Program Development at BCBSM.
3 Value Partnership: Physician Incentive Programs Update. BCBSM Liaison Group. March 2007.
Highmark BlueCross BlueShield
Highmark, which serves 29 counties in western Pennsylvania, initiated its Quality Blue P4P 
program in 1996 for primary care physicians, focusing on reductions in the total cost of care. 
As managed care continued to decline, the health plan began reducing the emphasis on “cost 
of care,” replacing it with quality measures. By 2005, Highmark’s revised P4P methodology was 
utilized for both for FFS and capitated members.1 There are a total of 14 HEDIS-like quality 
measures. The performance of physicians participating in the Quality Blue program is evaluated 
relative to the performance of their peers practicing in the same specialty. Participants are awarded 
one point if they meet or exceed the specialty average for a clinical category and 0.5 points for 
meeting or exceeding 90 percent of the specialty average. The program also awards points for 
higher generic prescribing rates, expanded office hours, use of EHR and e-Rx technology and 
quality improvement projects or certifications like the NCQA and ABIM PIM’s.
Bonus payments are made as add-ons to evaluation and management services billed by the 
primary care physician. Physicians receive payments of $0 to $9 based on their performance on a 
real time basis at the time the claim is processed.2
As of April 2007, Highmark’s physician incentive plan included only primary care providers. 
Highmark expects to grow the program to include ten clinical specialties by 2009.2 This initiative will 
begin in 2007 with profiling only, no P4P. Public reporting of the specialist data will begin in 2008. 
This phase-in period will provide physicians the opportunity to improve group performance and 
permit physician feedback to Highmark prior to the implementation of the rewards program.3
1 The Highmark Story. Available at: https://www.highmark.com/hmk2/about/index/shtml.
2 Quality Blue: A Physician Pay-for-Performance Program. Highmark BCBS.
3 Phone call with Dr. Michael Madden, MD, Medical Director for Quality and Medical Performance Management at Highmark BCBS.
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Bridges to Excellence
Bridges to Excellence, or BTE, is a nonprofit organization that administers monetary rewards and 
recognition programs for providers: Diabetes Care Link, Cardiac Care Link (CCL) and Physician 
Practice Connection. These programs are based on NCQA clinical performance measures. 
Physicians contracting with participating health plans, employer coalitions or employers can 
receive bonuses of up to $160 per eligible cardiac patient under the CCL program, up to $80 
per eligible diabetic patient and up to $50 per eligible member under the physician office link 
reward program, although the potential reward varies depending on the physician’s local incentive 
program payment methodology.1
Beginning in 2007, BTE will implement the Spine Care Link (SCL) and the Internal Medicine 
Care Link (IMCL). Under the SCL program, participating physicians could be eligible for bonuses 
of up to $50 per member per year and receive BTE certification based on relative performance 
level.2 The IMCL program, a partnership with the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM), 
will allow internists to qualify for maintenance of board certification, continuing education credits 
and bonus payments. As of April 2007, these scoring and payment methodologies were not yet 
estabilished.3
1 AHA/ASA/NCAQA Heart/Stroke Recognition Program: Standards, Performance Criteria, and Scoring. Available at:  
http://web.ncqa.org/tabid/140/Default.aspx.
2 http://www.bte.org.
3 Email correspondence with Sarah Burstein, Project Leader, Bridges to Excellence.
 
Diabetes care link Cardiac care link Physician office link
•	 HbA1c	control	
— <7.0% → 40% of patients;
— >9% → ≤15% of patients
•	 LDL	control	
— ≤130 mg/dL → ≤37% of patient
— <100mg/dL → 36% of patients
•	 Blood	pressure	control	
—  ≥140/90mmHg → ≤35% patients
— <130/80mmHg → 25% patients
•	 Eye	examination	 
→ 60% patients
•	 Nephropathy	assessment	 
→ 80% of patients
•	 Foot	Examination	→ 80% of patients
•	 Smoking	status	and	cessation	advice	
or treatment → 80% of patients
•	 Blood	pressure	control 
<140/90 mmHg → 75% of patients
•	 Complete	lipid	profile	 
→ 80% of patients
•	 Cholesterol	control	 
<100 mg/gL → 50% of patients
•	 Administering	aspirin	or	other	
antithrombotic  
→ 80% of patients
•	 Smoking	cessation	counseling	or	
treatment
•	 Access	and	communication
•	 Patient	tracking	and	registry
•	 Care	management	
•	 Patient	self-management	support
•	 Electronic	prescribing
•	 Test	tracking	
•	 Referral	tracking
•	 Performance	reporting	and	
improvement
•	 Interoperability
Paying for quality: Understanding and assessing physician pay-for-performance initiatives | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 13 | 27 
Findings
Clinical Patient experience Information technology Physician incentive bonus
• Diabetes management → 
Percent of members 18-75 
with diabetes who had each of 
the following
— HbA1c
— HbA1c poor control >9.0%
— LDL-C screening <100 
mg/dl
— Nephropathy monitoring
• Breast Cancer Screening → 
Percent of women 40-69 with 
annual mammogram
• Percent of adults 50-80 who 
had appropriate screening for 
colorectal cancer 
• Doctor-patient communication
— Can patient easily 
understand clinical 
guidance?
— Did physician show respect 
for patient?
• Timely access to care
— Can patients get an 
appointment when they 
want one?
— Do the appointments start 
on time?
• Specialty Care
— Can patients get an 
appointment to see a 
specialist if needed? 
• Integrate clinical electronic 
datasets for population 
management
— Computerized registries 
updated twice per year
— Actionable reports/query 
lists from a disease registry 
updated twice per year
• Support clinical decision 
making at point of care:
— E-prescribing
— E-drug checks for safety 
and efficiency
— E-lab results
— E-reminders
• Physician organizations 
may qualify for physician 
incentive bonus 
opportunity if incentives 
are provided to individual 
physician for:
— Clinical quality
— Patient experience
• Individualized rewards 
may include
— Bonus paid 
commensurate with 
performance
— Tangible rewards to 
physicians, such as 
increased patient 
volume
Integrated Healthcare Association
The Integrated Health Association (IHA), a collaborative nonprofit organization based in 
California, initiated a pay-for-performance program in 2002.1 As of 2006, seven health plans 
representing over 6 million commercial HMO/PPO members participated in the program.2 The 
performance measures fall into four categories: clinical, patient experience, IT enabled systems 
and efficiency, all of which are adapted from the NCQA’s Healthcare Effectiveness Data and 
Information Set (HEDIS).3 Each year, between July and October, payments commensurate with 
physician group performance are distributed to each group by the participating health plans.4 
Actual payment versus the total potential payout varies for each health plan but is a function of 
the relative performance of the group. A ten percent physician bonus opportunity is available if 
the physician organization operates an internal physician monitoring system to measure patient 
satisfaction and has evidence-based clinical quality measures, and also if other incentives of 
monetary value are in place, such as for attendance at professional conferences.
1 Damberg, CL, Raube K, Williams T, Shortell SM. “Paying for Performance: Implementing a Statewide Project in California.”  
Quality Management in Health Care, vol. 14, 2005.
2 http://www.iha.org.
3 Integrated Healthcare Association California Pay-for-Performance Program: P4P Measurement Year 2006 Manual.  
Updated November 30, 2006.
4 Email correspondence with Delores Yanagihara, IHA P4P Program Development Manager.
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United Kingdom
Over a period of 18 months, the British Medical Association and the National Health Service 
Confederation, with the assistance of a small group of academic advisors, negotiated a pay-for-
performance program for primary care physicians. These practitioners can earn up to 1,000 points 
for performance on a set of indicators, with an additional 50 points for provision of prompt access 
to services. The indicators relate to clinical care in ten areas (550 points), practice organization and 
patient experience. The formula for assigning points takes into account practice characteristics, and 
criteria are specified for excluding individual patients from the calculations.1, 2 Approximately $3.2 
billion in new funds was allocated for physician rewards to be distributed over a 3-year period. 
Payment was limited to $133 per point in 2004–2005, with a maximum possible payment of 
$139,400 per physician. In its first year, the median practice achieved 95.5% of available points. 
On average, gross practice income grew by about $40,000 for that year.3, 4
1 Roland M. “Linking Physicians’ Pay to the Quality of Care—a Major Experiment in the United Kingdom.” The New England Jour-
nal of Medicine, vol. 351, no. 14, 2004. 
2 McDonald R, Harrison S, Checkland K, Campbell SM, Roland M. “Impact of Financial Incentives on Clinical Autonomy and Inter-
nal Motivation in Primary Care: Ethnographic Study.” British Medical Journal, vol. 334, 2007. 
3 Campbell S, Reeves D, Kontopantelis E, Middleton E, Sibbald,B, Roland M. “Quality of Primary Care in England with the Introduc-
tion of Pay-for-Performance.” The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 357, 2007. 
4 Doran T, Fullwood C, Gravelle H, Reeves D, Kontopantelis E, Hiroeh U, Roland M. “Pay-for-Performance Programs in Family 
Practices in the United Kingdom.” The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 355, no. 4, 2006.
Clinical Organizational
•	 Coronary	heart	disease
•	 Stroke,	Transient	ischemic	attack
•	 Hypertension
•	 Hyperthyroidism
•	 Diabetes
•	 Mental	disorder
•	 Chronic	obstructive	pulmonary	disease
•	 Asthma
•	 Epilepsy
•	 Cancer
•	 Records	and	information	about	patients	 
(e.g., smoking status recorded)
•	 Communicating	with	patients	 
(e.g., availability of staff to talk with patients  
by phone)
•	 Education	and	training	 
(e.g., documented minimum number of  
reviews of significant events)
•	 Management	of	medications	 
(e.g., medication review of patients within a 
specific time period)
•	 Management	of	practice	 
(e.g., backing up computer data)
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The studies reviewed or cited in this Synthesis use a variety of methodological approaches. The 
purpose of this Appendix is to provide a non-technical overview of these approaches, addressing 
which are likely to be the most useful and appropriate for addressing different types of research 
questions.
Experimental Approaches 
When reviewing clinical literature and, increasingly, health services research literature, authors 
frequently order studies according to their “strength of evidence,” where the strongest, most 
reliable findings typically are presumed to be generated by studies employing some type of 
experimental design. In many cases, in fact, studies that do not employ experimental designs 
are excluded from reviews because their findings are not considered, a priori, to be reliable. The 
implication is that non-experimental studies represent “less rigorous” research and, as such, do 
little to advance the field of research, and that findings from non-experimental studies should be 
heavily discounted or ignored by policy-makers. This is unfortunate because, while experimental 
studies are certainly preferable for answering specific types of questions, they are less useful in 
addressing others. For instance, in evaluating the impact of financial incentives on the quality 
of care delivered by physicians, experimental designs are limited in their ability to address 
many questions of great interest to policy-makers, such as: Why do physician incentives change 
physician behavior in some circumstances and not others? How should incentives be structured 
to achieve their greatest impact? To understand the strengths and limitations of the evidence 
generated by the experimental studies cited in this synthesis, it is important to be clear about what 
experimental methods are intended to accomplish.
Basically, experimental designs are intended to eliminate all factors that could affect an outcome 
except for the “intervention” of interest. For a pay-for-performance program or similar initiative 
that uses financial incentives in an effort to improve the quality of care provided by physicians, 
the most effective way to do this, theoretically, would be to randomly assign physicians into 
two groups, with one group “exposed” to the incentive and a second group not exposed. 
The outcome(s) of interest to policy-makers, and that is expected to change as a result of the 
intervention, then is measured for each group before and after the intervention. Post intervention 
measurement is carried out after enough time has elapsed to allow the intervention to have an 
impact, with the change in outcome measure calculated for each group. If a difference in these 
two “change measures” is observed that is so large it was unlikely to have occurred by chance, the 
analyst then concludes it resulted from the interventionin this case, the financial incentive to 
which the first group of physicians was exposed. An important aspect of experimental designs is 
that they are not constructed to shed light on the “mechanism” by which the change occurred. 
That is, what physician behaviors changed to generate the findings? How did they change? Why 
were changes observed for some physicians and not others? For some outcome measures and 
not others? In fact, the goal of the experimental method is to eliminate any possible differences 
between the two groups of physicians, and it is these differences that are likely to be essential in 
understanding the change process.
Obviously, there are severe practical obstacles to employing “pure” randomized designs in 
assessing the impact of physician financial incentives on quality of care. Dudley (21) discusses 
several of these obstacles. Randomization processes are hard to carry out rigorously in real world 
settings and, in part to assure rigorous randomization, the settings chosen may be limited in their 
comparability to most physician practices. To control costs and achieve cooperation on the part of 
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physicians, the “sample” of physicians or physician practices is often quite small, making it hard 
to determine if any observed differences in outcomes are due to the incentive program, or simply 
occurred by chance. 
The authors of the experimental studies cited in this synthesis were well aware of these difficulties 
and limitations. When they found no significant impacts—which was the case most of the time, 
as we note in the Synthesis—the authors typically offered relatively ad hoc, but nevertheless very 
persuasive, explanations of why that was the case. Or, they retrospectively attempted to collect 
information on physician behaviors that may have worked against finding an impact from the 
incentive. Even when significant differences were detected, some authors sought to understand 
this result through subsequent data analysis outside of the experimental design and, in one case, 
concluded that it was due to better documentation rather than actual improvements in care (25, 26).
In an attempt to avoid some of the limitations of pure randomized designs, other authors 
evaluated the impact of ongoing incentive programs implemented by health plans or other payers. 
Randomization of physicians did not occur in these programs, but researchers sought to retain 
the strengths of an “experimental” approach by constructing “quasi-experimental” designs. The 
challenge to the researchers is to identify a “comparison group” that has characteristics, which 
mirror, as closely as possible, the “non-intervention” group in a randomized design. This often 
requires some ingenuity. Rosenthal et al. (60) used this approach, designating physician groups in 
a different region served by a health plan, and where an incentive was not in effect, as the “non-
intervention” group in their study. 
No comparison group in a quasi-experimental design is ever ideal, however, in the sense of 
perfectly replicating what would have occurred through a randomization process. To address 
this problem, researchers attempt to gather as much data as possible on different characteristics 
of intervention and comparison group members, and then use statistical techniques to “adjust 
away” differences between the groups. Even then, there is the possibility that the groups differ 
on characteristics that are either not observable or that, while observable in theory, cannot 
be measured with existing data sources. As a consequence, when interpreting their results, 
researchers using quasi-experimental designs typically are careful to note that any differences 
they observe could reflect underlying differences in the groups and not necessarily the impact 
of the “intervention” being assessed. Thus, Rosenthal et al. (60) noted that they “…relied on the 
assumption that absent the [program], trends (or differences in trends) in quality improvement 
in California would have resembled those in the Pacific Northwest network. Although this 
assumption is generally supported by the similarity of [pre-program] trends between the two 
networks, it is not directly testable”. Similarly, when no significant outcomes are found, there 
is a possibility that real differences between the groups may, in fact, exist but were obscured by 
unmeasured, uncontrolled differences in group characteristics. Nevertheless, quasi-experimental 
studies addressing actual physician incentive programs in real world settings generate findings that 
likely have greater “face validity” for policy-makers than findings from small scale, more tightly 
structured studies based on pure randomized designs. It is important to reiterate that, because 
quasi-experimental studies attempt to replicate, to the greatest degree possible, the randomized, 
experimental approach, they also are not designed to address the mechanisms by which changes 
in outcomes occurred, or the factors that inhibited or facilitated change. In discussing and 
interpreting their findings, researchers using quasi-experimental designs face the same challenges 
as those using randomized designs.
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The “before-after” approach is relatively common in evaluation literature of all types and used 
in some studies cited in the Synthesis. It typically is viewed as weaker than quasi-experimental 
designs in its ability to detect the impact of an intervention, like a physician incentive program, 
on an outcome measure of interest. In before/after studies, no external comparison group is used 
to track performance on the outcome measure before and after the intervention. Instead, the 
outcome of interest is tracked only for the intervention group, before and after the intervention. 
Essentially, the pre-intervention outcomes are taken to represent what would have occurred in 
the absence of the intervention. For example, the performance of physicians on a set of quality 
indicators, measured before the physicians are exposed to new financial incentives, and trended 
forward, might be used to represent the outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of the 
incentive program. Sometimes this is referred to as “using the participants as their own controls.” 
The credibility of this approach is strongest in relatively stable environments, and where there are 
a relatively large number of pre-intervention observations of an outcome measure over time, so 
that statistical methods can reliably fit a time trend to these data. 
If there are other factors in the environment that influence the outcome measures of interest, 
then the adoption of past performance as a reflection of what outcomes would have been in 
the absence of the intervention is less defensible. Concerns about this are certainly relevant 
when using a “before-after” approach to assess the impact of physician incentives on quality. 
There are a large number of ongoing efforts to improve quality, including organizational quality 
improvement efforts and public reporting of comparative quality data, and these efforts change 
over time. Statistical methods incorporating time trends can be used to control, in a relatively 
crude way, for the presence of these other efforts, but this approach is not always convincing. 
Essentially, the use of “before-after” analysis in assessing the impact of physician incentive 
programs to improve quality is less desirable than analysis that incorporates contemporaneous 
comparison groups in a quasi-experimental design. Researchers adopting the before-after approach 
recognize its limitations and often attempt to address them by comparing their findings to 
national trend data. Alternatively, they may restrict their analysis to relatively short time periods 
(e.g., one observation period before and one after implementation of an incentive program) to 
minimize the potential impact of external environmental changes and the need to fit statistical 
trend lines to past performance data. However, immediate responses to incentives could be 
quite different than longer-term responses. Again, because the before-after design, carefully 
implemented, essentially attempts to replicate a pure experimental approach to the greatest degree 
possible within the study setting, it has the same inherent limitations as noted above with respect 
to the questions it addresses.
Non-Experimental Approaches
Non-experimental approaches employ observational data to explore factors that influence the 
nature of physician responses to financial incentives and how those responses are, in turn, linked 
to the quality measures of interest. The observational data can be gathered through interviews, 
surveys, or existing (typically administrative) sources. In the best of these studies, attention is 
focused on understanding the mechanism of change, which typically requires an implicit or 
explicit “behavioral model” of individual or organizational response to the intervention. (For a 
discussion of this point see Frolich et al. (29) and Town et al. (69).) This behavioral model is used 
by researchers to generate hypotheses concerning which factors are likely to affect behavior and 
how the intervention is likely to interact with these factors to produce change. A “treatment/
control” group comparison is not required. Rather than trying to eliminate differences through 
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randomization, the testing of hypotheses generated through behavioral models relies on, and 
exploits, existing variation on the characteristics of participants and the settings in which they 
respond to interventions. (This distinction is cogently drawn out by Pawson and Tilley (50).) For 
example, a researcher might hypothesize that physicians in large medical groups will improve 
performance to a greater degree than physicians in smaller groups. The model underlying this 
hypothesis might incorporate assumptions about the importance of infrastructure support 
in minimizing response costs, the way in which response costs are incurred by physicians in 
groups with different features and the relative importance of response costs in influencing 
behavior. The behavioral model would be relied on to identify the variables of interest and 
would guide data collection. However, in order to test the hypothesis, and explore its underlying 
structure, variation in the key variables is necessary. Consequently, the researcher would design 
the study to ensure that, to the extent possible, this variation existed (50). This contrasts with 
experimental research approaches, where a key part of the design involves eliminating differences 
in intervention and control groups. Both approaches are appropriate; they simply are designed to 
address different questions. 
One key to mounting a non-experimental study or a stream of research that generates credible 
results on questions that are of interest to policy-makers is the development of a persuasive 
theory. This theory must permit the specification of hypotheses that can be tested and rejected. 
A common criticism of non-experimental studies is that they too often are little more than 
statistical “fishing expeditions” uninformed by theory. By this, critics usually mean that the 
researcher has used statistical techniques to analyze large amounts of data, found statistically 
significant relationships, and engaged in a variety of “after the fact,” ad hoc speculations about the 
possible reasons for these relationships. In the worst case, the researcher may not have adjusted 
the statistical testing procedure, ignoring the likelihood that, when a large number of tests are 
conducted, some statistically significant relationships will surface by chance. 
Ideally, in non-experimental studies, the results from the testing of hypotheses in one study 
would be used to revise the behavioral model and inform the design of subsequent physician 
incentive programs, generating opportunities to test new, refined hypotheses. In this manner, the 
mechanisms by which financial incentives directed at improving quality affect physician behavior 
could be better understood (21, 50). As a result, policy-makers could improve the effectiveness of 
pay-for-performance and other financial incentive programs over time. Ongoing research on the 
United Kingdom’s physician pay-for-performance program holds this potential. No pre-program 
data were available on a consistent basis (although Campbell, et. al., 2007, and Simpson, et. al., 
2006 used pre-program data on selected practices in their evaluation (11, 65)) and the program 
was instituted across all regions of the National Health Service, precluding the use of experimental 
methods to analyze program impacts. However, a non-experimental analysis of physician 
responses in the first year suggests that the willingness and ability of physicians to exclude 
complicated patients from the measurement process was a significant factor in achieving higher 
performance scores (20). This finding focuses the attention of policy-makers on refining patient 
exclusion criteria going forward.
Just as there are challenges in mounting “pure” experimental studies, designing and conducting 
non-experimental studies that proceed in a logical, sequential manner is likely to be daunting 
in practice. Most non-experimental studies are “one-off,” as are most experimental studies. (An 
exception in the Synthesis is offered by the experimental studies conducted by Fairbrother et 
al. (25, 26).) Researchers take advantage of a particular incentive program mounted by payers 
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to analyze a specific question. Results seldom are used to restructure programs, with follow-on 
evaluations. Also, at least to date, analyses of physician responses to financial incentives intended 
to improve quality have generally not been guided by strong behavioral models. As a result, the 
research literature has not evolved in a coherent path that maximizes its usefulness to policy-
makers. Dudley (21) observes that, for this to occur, funders would need to support “sequential 
and parallel hypothesis testing” (p. 1823) and argues that this is essential if research is to help 
policy-makers “…to understand the nuances of when and how incentives work” (p. 1823).
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Controlled experiments in the U.S. providing financial rewards to physicians for quality
Author
Geographic 
scope Physicians
Type of data  
analyzed
Quality 
measure(s)
Financial  
incentives
Effect of  
financial  
incentives Comments
Fairbrother  
et al., 1999  
(25)
New York 
City
60 inner-city, office-
based pediatricians 
randomly assigned 
to 1 of 3 interven-
tions: bonus and 
feedback, enhanced 
fee-for-service and 
feedback, and feed-
back only
Chart reviews  
of 50 randomly  
selected children 
(3–35 months olds) 
at 4 month intervals 
over 1 year
Percent of 
children with 
up-to-date  
immunizations
Bonus: $1,000 per 
physician for a 20% 
improvement from 
baseline; $2,000 for 
a 40% improvement, 
and $5,000 for reach-
ing 80% compliance. 
Enhanced FFS: $5 
per vaccine admin-
istered on schedule, 
$15 per visit at 
which more than one 
scheduled vaccine 
was administered
Significant 
improvement 
in bonus 
group but 
not in other 
groups
Improvement 
was due  
primarily to  
better docu-
mentation
Fairbrother 
et al., 2001 
(26)
New York 
City
57 physicians  
completed second 
study year; 24 in a 
group receiving bo-
nus payments,  
12 in enhanced  
fee-for-service, and 
21 in a control group 
receiving perfor-
mance feedback 
only
Chart reviews  
of 50 randomly  
selected children 
(3–35 months old) 
at 4 month intervals 
over 1 year
Percent of 
children with 
up-to-date  
immunizations
Bonus: At each 
data collection 
point, $1,000 for 
30 percentage 
point improvement 
and $2,500 for 45 
percentage point 
improvement; $5,000 
for reaching 80% 
coverage and $7,500 
for 90%.
FFS: $5 per vaccine 
administered on 
schedule and $15 for 
each visit in which all 
due vaccines were 
administered
Significant 
improvement 
under both 
programs
Improvement 
was due primarily 
to better docu-
mentation
Grady et al., 
1997  
(32)
Dayton, 
OH and 
Springfield, 
MA
61 practices, with 
1–6 community-
based primary care 
physicians per 
practice, randomly 
assigned to one of 
three interventions: 
small incentive in 
combination with 
feedback; educa-
tion; and education 
plus chart reminder
Chart audits of 
women 50 years and 
older conducted at 
baseline and quar-
terly for one year
Mammogra-
phy referral 
rates, mam-
mography 
completion 
rates, mam-
mography 
compliance 
rates
Annual payment 
based on level 
achieved; amount  
not clear but called 
“token” by authors
None Financial  
incentive was 
combined with 
feedback  
program
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Author
Geographic 
scope Physicians
Type of data  
analyzed
Quality 
measure(s)
Financial  
incentives
Effect of  
financial  
incentives Comments
Hillman  
et al., 1998 
(36)
Philadelphia 52 largest primary 
care sites affiliated 
with Medicaid HMO 
were randomly as-
signed to interven-
tion or usual care
Chart audits at 
baseline and every 
6 months for 1.5 
years for women 50 
years and older
Percent of 
charts in 
compliance 
with cancer 
screening 
guidelines for 
four types of 
cancer
The 3 sites with 
highest scores re-
ceived bonus equal 
to 20% of capitation 
for target patient 
group; 3 practices 
with next highest 
scores and 3 with 
greatest improve-
ment received 10% 
bonus
None Physician aware-
ness of interven-
tion was 67%; 
with 30% of 
physicians not 
responding to a 
survey; screen-
ing rates for both 
groups approxi-
mately doubled 
in study period 
but remained 
low overall
Hillman  
et al., 1999 
(37)
Philadelphia 49 physician 
practices in a 
Medicaid plan 
randomly assigned 
to feedback and 
incentive (19), 
feedback only (15), 
and control (15)
Chart audits at 
baseline and 6 
month intervals over 
18 months
Compliance 
with pediatric 
preventive 
care 
guidelines
3 sites with highest 
compliance scores 
received a bonus 
of 20% of the 
site’s total 6-month 
capitation payment 
for children to  
age 7. The next  
3 highest scoring 
sites received 10% 
of capitation, as did 
3 sites showing most 
improvement
None Only 56% of 
the practices 
randomized to 
the incentive 
program were 
aware of the 
program, but 
there was no 
difference in 
performance 
between 
practices that 
were aware and 
those that were 
not
Kouides  
et al., 1998 
(42)
Monroe 
County, NY
54 solo or group 
practices that 
had participated 
in 1990 Medicare 
Demonstration 
Project, randomized 
to a control group 
and an incentive 
group
Physician-reported 
immunizations for 
elderly patients 
combined with 
public health 
immunizations and 
union-sponsored 
immunizations
1990 
influenza 
immunization 
rate and 
improvement 
in rate from 
1990–1991
Payment of $.80 
per immunization 
if rate of 70% 
achieved; $1.60 per 
immunization if rate 
of 85% achieved
No effect 
on mean 
immunization 
rate; signifi-
cantly larger 
improvement 
in immuni-
zation rate 
for incentive 
group
Financial 
incentive was 
combined 
with intensive 
promotion of 
immunizations 
at physician 
practices
Controlled experiments in the U.S. providing financial rewards to physicians for quality (cont’d)
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Evaluations of programs in the U.S. that provide financial incentives to physicians for quality
Author
Geographic 
scope Physicians
Type of data 
analyzed
Quality 
measure(s) Financial incentives
Effect of financial 
incentives Comments
Amundson 
et al., 2003 
(2)
Minnesota Physicians 
in 19–20 
medical groups 
participating 
in a network 
model HMO
Audits of 
14,489 
ambulatory 
patient records 
from 1996–
1998
Documentation 
of tobacco use 
and discussion 
of tobacco use, 
with medical 
group targets of 
80% for each
Bonus pools 
established for each 
medical group, with 
a portion of bonus 
payment directed 
to performance on 
tobacco quality 
measures
Documentation 
increased 
significantly 
for 13 of 20 
groups, and 
discussion 
improved for 7 
groups
No contemporaneous 
comparison group 
was present 
and increases in 
“discussion” may be 
due in part to better 
documentation
Beaulieu and 
Horrigan, 
2005  
(5)
Upstate New 
York
21 physicians 
and 624 
diabetic 
patients
Performance 
self-reported 
by physicians 
three times in 
study year
Composite 
measure of 
performance 
in delivering 
diabetes care 
according to 
best practices
Physicians receive 
$3 pmpm for Medi-
care patients and 
$.75 for commercial 
for composite score 
above 6.86; $1.50 
and $.37 for a score 
above 6.23 and $.75 
and $.18 for a 50% 
improvement, with 
score below 6.23
Composite 
scores 
increased by 
48%
It is not possible to 
separate the effect 
of other changes 
introduced at the 
same time from the 
effect of financial 
incentives, and 
physician participants 
were volunteers
Chung et al., 
2003  
(15)
Hawaii 800 of 
approximately 
1,500 eligible 
physicians 
in a PPO 
volunteered to 
participate in 
first year
Claims data 
from 1997–
2000
Use of ACE 
inhibitors 
or ARB in 
heart failure, 
measurement 
of HbAlc in 
diabetes, 
and rates of 
childhood 
immunizations
3.5% of base 
fees were earned, 
on average, by 
participating 
physicians; 17 
physicians received 
maximum rewards 
in 2001, with 14 
receiving $10,000 
and 3 receiving 
$13,000
Consistent, 
statistically 
significant 
improvement 
in use of ACE 
inhibitors or 
ARB and in 
measurement 
of HbAlc
No contemporaneous 
control group
Felt-Lisk  
et al., 2007 
(27)
California Physician 
practices in 
five different 
Medicaid 
managed 
care plans 
that received 
payments for 
performance 
and practices in 
two plans that 
did not
Encounter 
data from 
2002–2005, 
Medicaid 
administrative 
data, meeting 
notes, and 
interviews
Percentage of 
plan members 
meeting HEDIS 
well-baby visit 
guidelines
From 2003–2005, 
four of five plans 
paid bonuses 
to contracting 
practices based 
on the proportion 
of children who 
met well-baby 
visit guidelines. 
The fifth made 
payments directly 
to physicians from a 
bonus pool
There was 
overall 
improvement 
in performance 
related to 
guidelines 
for well-baby 
care but there 
was no effect 
in two plans, 
possible small 
effects in two 
plans. There 
appeared to 
be substantial 
improvement in 
only one plan
Little information 
was provided 
regarding statistical 
methods used to 
estimate difference 
in differences effects. 
More successful 
programs offered 
greater rewards 
and had better 
communication 
with physicians 
about program 
characteristics
Greene  
et al., 2004  
(33)
Rochester, 
NY
500 internists, 
200 family 
practitioners, 
and 200 pedia-
tricians
Medical claims 
organized using 
episode treat-
ment group 
methods
Treatment ex-
ceptions per 
episode in treat-
ment of sinusitis
Amount withheld 
from capitation 
payment decreased 
from 15% to 10% 
for top 5% of per-
formers and in-
creased to 20% for 
the bottom 5%
Mean overall 
exceptions per 
episode de-
creased due to 
decrease in use 
of less effective 
or inappropriate 
antibiotics
The financial incen-
tives were part of a 
multi-faceted inter-
vention and it is not 
possible to determine 
the specific effect of 
financial incentives; 
no contemporaneous 
control group
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Author
Geographic 
scope Physicians
Type of data 
analyzed
Quality 
measure(s) Financial incentives
Effect of financial 
incentives Comments
Larson,  
Cannon  
and Towner,
2006  
(44)
Utah 400 employed 
physicians who 
were part of in-
tegrated health 
system
Laboratory 
data, health 
plan claims, 
physician  
billing, clinical 
information 
systems
Six different per-
formance mea-
sures related to 
the treatment of 
diabetes
Overall financial 
incentive totaled 
0.5% to 1.0% of 
compensation with 
about half directed 
at diabetes care
There was 
statistically 
significant im-
provement in all 
six indicators
Financial incentives 
were part of a com-
plex, multifaceted 
quality improvement 
intervention, so it 
is not possible to 
determine the effect 
of the financial incen-
tives by themselves; 
no contemporaneous 
control group
Leven-
Scherz, 
DeVita and 
Timble, 2006 
(45)
Massachu-
setts
Physicians 
participating 
in a provider 
network that 
contracts with 
health plans are 
compared to 
physicians not 
in the network
Medical  
claims
Performance 
relative to 
benchmarks for 
diabetes and 
asthma care, 
selected from 
larger group of 
performance 
measures
Bonus payments 
and the return of 
portion of withholds 
in managed care 
contracts; magni-
tude of the incen-
tives not stated
Significantly 
greater im-
provement  
in diabetes 
measures,  
relative to the 
comparison 
group; no  
significant  
improvement in 
asthma care
It is not possible to 
isolate the effect of 
financial incentives 
from other quality 
improvement efforts 
implemented at the 
same time
Morrow  
et al., 1995  
(48)
Northeastern 
United States
Primary care 
physicians con-
tracting with 
an IPA model 
HMO
Audited  
medical  
chart data
Rates of child-
hood MMR 
immunization, 
cholesterol 
screening for 
adults, appropri-
ate charting of 
information
Payment in addition 
to base capitation 
payment to primary 
care physicians; 
amount of payment 
for quality indica-
tors not specified
Significant im-
provements in 
all measures
Longitudinal study 
with no contempora-
neous control group
Rosenthal 
et al., 2005 
(60)
California 
and the  
Pacific  
Northwest
Analytic sample 
included 134 
medical groups 
contracting 
with a health 
plan in Califor-
nia that were 
exposed to 
a financial 
incentive and 
33 groups in 
the Northwest 
contracting 
with the same 
groups but not 
exposed to the 
incentive
Claims-based 
performance 
data aggre-
gated to the 
physician group 
level
Cervical can-
cer screening, 
mammography, 
and hemoglobin 
testing (selected 
from 10 mea-
sures subject to 
financial incen-
tives)
Payments of $0.23 
PMPM for each 
target achieved. A 
group with 10,000 
plan members 
could potentially 
earn $270,000 per 
year
Significant 
improvement 
in cervical can-
cer screening 
relative to the 
control group; 
no significant 
improvement in 
the other two 
measures
Most (75%) of the 
dollars were earned 
by groups that had 
achieved the bench-
marks prior to the 
incentive program, 
however there was 
substantial improve-
ment in low perfor-
mance groups
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